穆迪下调日本评级原文（英文）

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Rat ing Act ion:  Moody's downgr ades Japan  to A1  f rom Aa3;  out look stable
Gl o b a l  Cre d i t Re s e a rc h   -  0 1  De c   2 0 1 4
Si ngapore, December 01, 2014 -- Moody's Investors Servi ce today downgraded the Government of Japan's debt
rati ng by one notch to A1 from Aa3. The outl ook i s stabl e.
The key dri vers for the downgrade are the fol l owi ng:
1. Hei ghtened uncertai nty over the achi evabi l i ty of fi scal  defi ci t reducti on goal s;
2. Uncertai nty over the timi ng and effecti veness of growth enhanci ng pol i cy measures, agai nst a background of
defl ati onary pressures; and
3. In consequence, i ncreased ri sk of ri si ng JGB yi el ds and reduced debt affordabi l i ty over the medi um term.
The A1 rati ng refl ects the government's si gni fi cant credi t strengths, i ncl udi ng a l arge, di verse economy wi th a
strong external  posi ti on, very hi gh i nsti tuti onal  strength and a very strong domesti c fundi ng base.
The stabl e outl ook refl ects the broad bal ance between upsi de ri sks i ncl udi ng si gni fi cant fi scal  consol i dati on and a
resumpti on of economi c growth, and downsi de ri sks i ncl udi ng i ntensi fi cati on of defl ati onary pressures and l oss i n
economi c momentum.
The rati ng acti on does not affect Japan's Aaa forei gn currency, l ocal  currency country and bank deposi t cei l i ngs.
Those cei l i ngs act as a cap on rati ngs that can be assi gned to the obl i gati ons of other enti ti es domi ci l ed i n the
country.
RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE
DRIVER 1: HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY OVER REACHING FISCAL TARGETS AND CONTAINING DEBT
The fi rst dri ver for the downgrade of the Japan government's debt rati ng to A1 i s the ri si ng uncertai nty over
whether the government's medi um-term defi ci t reducti on goal  i s achi evabl e, and whether pol i cy makers can
overcome the tensi ons i nherent i n promoti ng growth whi l e simul taneousl y stabi l i zi ng and reversi ng the ri si ng debt
traj ectory.
The Bank of Japan remai ns commi tted to monetary expansi on, wi th some posi ti ve impact on core CPI i nfl ati on.
However, whi l e monetary expansi on has boosted domesti c aggregate demand to some extent, the consumpti on
tax i ncrease on Apri l  1 2014 has exerted even more powerful  downward pressure. At l east i n the short term, defi ci t
reducti on i s undermi ni ng the growth revi tal i zati on obj ecti ve of Prime Mi ni ster Shi nzo Abe's economi c pol i cy
strategy.
The government's response, to announce a del ay i n the second step i n the consumpti on tax i ncrease, appears to
represent a shi ft i n pol i cy towards stemmi ng re-emergi ng defl ati onary pressures on economi c growth and away
from near-term fi scal  defi ci t reducti on. Thi s strategy coul d have meri ts. In our vi ew, the government's target of
hal vi ng the primary defi ci t bal ance, excl udi ng budgetary i nterest payments, by fi scal  2015 from i ts fi scal  2010 l evel
wi l l  be di ffi cul t to achi eve wi thout more robust nomi nal  GDP growth and hence improved buoyancy i n tax
revenues. In thei r absence, reachi ng the l ong-term target of a primary bal ance surpl us by 2020 wi l l  be even more
chal l engi ng.
However, the strategy al so poses ri sks to fi scal  consol i dati on and, over the l onger-term, to debt affordabi l i ty and
sustai nabi l i ty. Japan's defi ci ts and debt remai n very hi gh, and fi scal  consol i dati on wi l l  become i ncreasi ngl y di ffi cul t
to achi eve as time passes gi ven ri si ng government spendi ng, parti cul arl y for soci al  programs associ ated wi th a
rapi dl y agei ng popul ati on.
The government acknowl edges that addi ti onal  but as yet uni denti fi ed economi c and fi scal  reforms wi l l  be needed
for Japan to achi eve i ts primary bal ance target i n the second hal f of thi s decade. But the postponement of the
second stage of the i ncrease i n the consumpti on tax has resul ted i n the del ay of the 2015 budget, and a concrete
pl an to meet fi scal  targets i s not l i kel y to emerge unti l  the second hal f of 2015. The traj ectory of government debt,
proj ected at 245% of GDP i n 2014 accordi ng to the IMF, wi l l  onl y start to decl i ne under the most favorabl e
combi nati on of economi c and fi scal  reforms, i ncl udi ng tax and soci al  securi ty system reforms and total  factor
producti vi ty improvements, an end to defl ati on and achi evement of annual  nomi nal  GDP growth of more than 3.5%.
Gi ven current domesti c ci rcumstances and l ackl uster external  demand for Japan's exports, achi evi ng these
condi ti ons wi l l  be chal l engi ng.
DRIVER 2: ECONOMIC GROWTH POLICY UNCERTAINTIES AND CHALLENGES IN ENDING DEFLATION
The second dri ver for the downgrade i s the ri si ng uncertai nty over the government's abi l i ty to enhance medi um
term growth through structural  economi c reform -- the thi rd 'arrow' of Abenomi cs -- success i n whi ch wi l l  be cruci al
to achi eve fi scal  consol i dati on. Whi l e some i ndi cators suggest a pi ck-up i n economi c acti vi ty over the past year,
potenti al  economi c growth remai ns l ow.
GDP growth sharpl y contracted i n the second quarter of thi s year fol l owi ng the i ntroducti on on 1 Apri l  of the fi rst
step of the consumpti on tax i ncrease, to 8% from 5%. Output was al so affected by adverse weather i n the
summer to some extent. And both real  and nomi nal  GDP contracted agai n i n the thi rd quarter of the year, putti ng
Japan's economy i n recessi on for the thi rd time si nce gl obal  fi nanci al  cri si s.
Moreover the rel apse of the GDP defl ator, the broadest measure of pri ce movements, i nto negati ve terri tory i n the
thi rd quarter of thi s year hi ghl i ghts the di ffi cul t nature of endi ng more than a decade of defl ati on. Al though the
ratcheti ng up by the Bank of Japan of i ts quanti tati ve easi ng pol i ci es i n October may once agai n move the defl ator
back onto posi ti ve ground i n the fourth quarter of 2014, the task ahead for economi c revi tal i zati on and pri ce
refl ati on i s l ooki ng more chal l engi ng than envi saged by Prime Mi ni ster Abe when he i ntroduced hi s three-arrow
economi c pol i cy package i n March 2013.
Looki ng further ahead, the most notabl e structural  reform measure to be impl emented to date i s a reducti on i n
corporate taxati on begi nni ng i n fi scal  2015. The detai l s have yet to be announced, and the impl i cati ons for
busi ness i nvestment are therefore sti l l  uncl ear. It i s not yet cl ear what further measures the government wi l l
choose, or be abl e, to take to address the deep-rooted structural  probl ems of Japan's economy, i ncl udi ng
broadeni ng l abor force parti ci pati on, enhanci ng corporate governance and deal i ng wi th the chal l enges posed by
demographi c trends.
DRIVER 3: EROSION OF POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY COULD UNDERMINE DEBT
AFFORDABILITY
The thi rd dri ver for the downgrade i s the potenti al  impl i cati ons of the fi rst two dri vers for the affordabi l i ty and
sustai nabi l i ty of Japan's huge debt l oad. Debt sustai nabi l i ty wi l l  rest on the conti nued wi l l i ngness of domesti c
i nvestors to provi de fundi ng at affordabl e rates for the government. Thi s l ooks l i kel y to remai n the case as l ong as
i nvestor confi dence i s not undermi ned. The JGB market has been characteri zed by l ow and stabl e i nterest rates
despi te the excepti onal  ri se i n debt si nce the 1990s. And JGB i nterest rates have remai ned l ow and stabl e through
a number of cri si s epi sodes, i ncl udi ng Japan's 1997-1998 fi nanci al  cri si s, the 2008 gl obal  fi nanci al  cri si s and the
2011 tsunami  and Fukushima nucl ear power pl ant di saster.
Nonethel ess, the Bank of Japan's efforts to rai se i nfl ati on to 2% may eventual l y put pressure on government bond
yi el ds and thereby rai se government borrowi ng costs. Ri si ng i nterest rates woul d i ncrease expendi ture and offset
gai ns from revenue buoyancy. Ri si ng uncertai nty regardi ng the government's capaci ty to del i ver on i ts pol i cy
obj ecti ves coul d rai se yi el ds wi thout any commensurate ri se i n revenues. Ei ther outcome woul d further undermi ne
the government's abi l i ty to meet i ts fi scal  defi ci t targets and reduce i ts debt burden over the medi um term, and
eventual l y start to undermi ne debt sustai nabi l i ty.
RATIONALE FOR A1 RATING AND STABLE OUTLOOK
JAPAN'S CREDIT STRENGTHS SUPPORTED BY A DEEP DOMESTIC BOND MARKET, STRONG
INSTITUTIONS, LOW VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Whatever the chal l enges faci ng the government, Japan retai ns very si gni fi cant credi t strengths. Its A1 rati ng and
stabl e outl ook are supported by i ts l arge, di verse economy, whi ch we characteri ze as havi ng 'Hi gh' economi c
strength. And even wi th the very si gni fi cant debt burden, we bel i eve that Japan exhi bi ts onl y 'Low' suscepti bi l i ty to
event ri sk. A marked home bi as on the part of resi dent i nvestors provi des a strong fundi ng base —domesti c
i nvestors retai n a marked preference for government bonds, whi ch has al l owed fi scal  defi ci ts to be funded at the
l owest nomi nal  rates gl obal l y over the past two decades. Pri vate sector fi scal  surpl uses remai n more than
adequate to fund government defi ci ts, wi thout the government resorti ng to external  fundi ng. We bel i eve that very
hi gh i nsti tuti onal  and structural  strengths, i ncl udi ng a deci si ve and powerful  central  bank, currentl y sustai n thi s
fundi ng advantage and are very unl i kel y to dimi ni sh over the rati ng hori zon.
Al though Japan's government gross fi nanci ng requi rements are far l arger than other advanced country
governments', conti ngent ri sks whi ch coul d el evate further such fi nanci ng needs are l ow and remote. Japan's
banki ng and corporate sectors have restored thei r heal th i n recent years i n terms of capi tal i zati on and
del everagi ng. Househol d debt i s at a moderate l evel  and has remai ned stabl e over the past decade. And despi te
l ow economi c growth, Japan's l abor market i s rel ati vel y sound i n regard to key features, such as l ow
unempl oyment l evel , the recent pi ck-up i n empl oyment and nomi nal  wages and a l abor force parti ci pati on rate
broadl y comparabl e wi th other advanced economi es.
Rel ated to Japan's home bi as i s i ts strong external  payments posi ti on, whi ch refl ects the accumul ated systemwi de savi ngs. At more than 60% of GDP i n 2013, Japan's net i nternati onal  i nvestment posi ti on i s much l arger than
any advanced i ndustri al  G-20 economy, i nsul ati ng i ts economy and capi tal  market from gl obal  shocks. Income
earned from Japan's si zabl e external  assets has hel ped to sustai n the current account surpl uses, al though thi s
has dimi ni shed owi ng to a shi ft i nto a trade defi ci t whi ch i s i n l arge part dri ven by the demand for energy imports
fol l owi ng the shutdown i n the nucl ear power i ndustry after the 2011 tsunami  and Fukushima nucl ear power pl ant
di saster.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN / UP
Whi l e the stabl e outl ook i ndi cates that we bel i eve the rati ng i s wel l  posi ti oned for the next twel ve to ei ghteen
months, factors that coul d prompt a negati ve rati ng acti on i ncl ude si gni fi cant di vergence from the path toward
achi evi ng fi scal  targets; an i ntensi fi cati on of defl ati onary pressures; a severe l oss i n economi c momentum; or a
shi ft i n the external  current account surpl us i nto persi stent defi ci t.
Moody's woul d consi der a posi ti ve rati ng acti on i f Japan were to impl ement pol i ci es that we concl uded were l i kel y
to restore economi c momentum and improve prospects for si gni fi cant fi scal  consol i dati on and debt reducti on.
GDP per capi ta (PPP basi s, US$): 36,654 (2013 Actual ) (al so known as Per Capi ta Income)
Real  GDP growth (% change): 1.5% (2013 Actual ) (al so known as GDP Growth)
Infl ati on Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.6% (2013 Actual )
Gen. Gov. Fi nanci al  Bal ance/GDP: -8.2% (2013 Actual ) (al so known as Fi scal  Bal ance)
Current Account Bal ance/GDP: 0.7% (2013 Actual ) (al so known as External  Bal ance)
External  debt/GDP: [not avai l abl e]
Level  of economi c devel opment: Very Hi gh l evel  of economi c resi l i ence
Defaul t hi story: No defaul t events (on bonds or l oans) have been recorded si nce 1983.
On 26 November 2014, a rati ng commi ttee was cal l ed to di scuss the rati ng of the Japan, Government of. The mai n
poi nts rai sed duri ng the di scussi on were: The i ssuer's i nsti tuti onal  strength/framework, have materi al l y decreased.
The i ssuer's fi scal  or fi nanci al  strength, i ncl udi ng i ts debt profi l e, has materi al l y decreased. An anal ysi s of thi s
i ssuer, rel ati ve to i ts peers, i ndi cates that a reposi ti oni ng of i ts rati ng woul d be appropri ate.
The pri nci pal  methodol ogy used i n thi s rati ng was Soverei gn Bond Rati ngs publ i shed i n September 2013. Pl ease
see the Credi t Pol i cy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of thi s methodol ogy.
The wei ghti ng of al l  rati ng factors i s descri bed i n the methodol ogy used i n thi s rati ng acti on, i f appl i cabl e.
Press rel eases of other rati ngs affected by thi s acti on wi l l  fol l ow separatel y.
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
For rati ngs i ssued on a program, seri es or category/cl ass of debt, thi s announcement provi des certai n regul atory
di scl osures i n rel ati on to each rati ng of a subsequentl y i ssued bond or note of the same seri es or category/cl ass
of debt or pursuant to a program for whi ch the rati ngs are deri ved excl usi vel y from exi sti ng rati ngs i n accordance
wi th Moody's rati ng practi ces. For rati ngs i ssued on a support provi der, thi s announcement provi des certai n
regul atory di scl osures i n rel ati on to the rati ng acti on on the support provi der and i n rel ati on to each parti cul ar rati ng
acti on for securi ti es that deri ve thei r credi t rati ngs from the support provi der's credi t rati ng. For provi si onal  rati ngs,
thi s announcement provi des certai n regul atory di scl osures i n rel ati on to the provi si onal  rati ng assi gned, and i n
rel ati on to a defi ni ti ve rati ng that may be assi gned subsequent to the fi nal  i ssuance of the debt, i n each case where
the transacti on structure and terms have not changed pri or to the assi gnment of the defi ni ti ve rati ng i n a manner
that woul d have affected the rati ng. For further i nformati on pl ease see the rati ngs tab on the i ssuer/enti ty page for
the respecti ve i ssuer on www.moodys.com.
For any affected securi ti es or rated enti ti es recei vi ng di rect credi t support from the primary enti ty(i es) of thi s rati ng
acti on, and whose rati ngs may change as a resul t of thi s rati ng acti on, the associ ated regul atory di scl osures wi l l
be those of the guarantor enti ty. Excepti ons to thi s approach exi st for the fol l owi ng di scl osures, i f appl i cabl e to
j uri sdi cti on: Anci l l ary Servi ces, Di scl osure to rated enti ty, Di scl osure from rated enti ty.
Regul atory di scl osures contai ned i n thi s press rel ease appl y to the credi t rati ng and, i f appl i cabl e, the rel ated rati ng
outl ook or rati ng revi ew.
Pl ease see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the l ead rati ng anal yst and to the Moody's l egal
enti ty that has i ssued the rati ng.
Pl ease see the rati ngs tab on the i ssuer/enti ty page on www.moodys.com for addi ti onal  regul atory di scl osures for
each credi t rati ng.
Thomas J Byrne
Seni or Vi ce Presi dent
Soverei gn Ri sk Group
Moody's Investors Servi ce Si ngapore Pte. Ltd.
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Si ngapore 48623
Si ngapore
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SUBSCRIBERS: (852) 3551-3077
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SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454
Rel easi ng Offi ce:
Moody's Investors Servi ce Si ngapore Pte. Ltd.
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Si ngapore 48623
Si ngapore
JOURNALISTS: (852) 3758 -1350
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穆迪下调日本评级行动:A1 Aa3;前景稳定文档已被翻译成其他语言
全球信贷研究- 01年2014年12月
新加坡,2014年12月01日——今天穆迪投资者服务公司下调了日本政府的债务评级下调一个级距至Aa3 A1。前景是稳定的。
评级下调的主要推动力是以下几点:
1。不确定性加剧财政赤字削减目标的成就感;
2。不确定性增长的时机和有效性提高的政策措施,通缩压力的背景下,
3。结果是,日本国债收益率上升的风险增加和减少债务负担能力在中期内。
A1评级反映了政府的重大信贷优势,包括一个大型的、多样化的经济强劲的外部位置,非常高的制度力量和一个非常强劲的国内资金基础。
稳定前景反映了广泛的平衡上行风险包括重大的财政整顿和恢复经济增长,和下行风险包括经济势头加剧通缩压力和损失。
日本Aaa评级行动并不影响外国货币,本币的国家和银行存款天花板。那些天花板作为评级上限可以分配给其他实体的义务在乡下定居。
评级的理由
理由降级
司机1:高度不确定性达到财政目标和控制债务
第一个司机日本政府的债务评级下调的A1是不断上升的不确定性是否政府中期削减赤字的目标是可以实现的,以及政策制定者能否克服促进经济增长的同时,稳定的内在矛盾和扭转债务上升轨迹。
日本央行仍致力于货币扩张,一些核心CPI通胀产生积极的影响。然而,尽管货币扩张促进了国内总需求在某种程度上,消费税增加2014年4月1日产生更强大的下行压力。至少在短期内,削减赤字正在破坏首相安倍晋三的发展振兴目标的经济政策策略。
政府的回应,宣布推迟第二步消费税增加,似乎代表了一种对遏制政策的转变正通缩压力对经济增长和远离短期财政赤字削减。这种策略的优点。在我们看来,政府的主要赤字减半的目标平衡,不包括预算利息,2015财政年度的2010财年的水平将很难实现没有更健壮的名义GDP增长,因此提高浮力在税收。在他们的缺席,达到基本平衡盈余的长期目标,到2020年将更具挑战性。
然而,财政整顿和策略也会带来风险,长期,债务负担能力和可持续性。日本的赤字和债务仍然非常高,财政整固将变得越来越难以实现政府支出上涨,但是随着时间的推移,特别是与人口迅速老龄化的社会项目。
不知名的政府承认,额外的经济和财政改革需要日本实现其基本平衡目标在今年下半年十年。但推迟第二阶段增加消费税导致推迟2015年的预算,和一个具体的计划,以满足财政目标不太可能出现,直到2015年下半年。政府债务的轨迹,预测2014年GDP的245%根据国际货币基金组织,只会开始下降在最有利的经济和财政改革,包括税收和社会保障制度改革和全要素生产率的改进,结束通货紧缩和成就的名义GDP年增长率超过3.5%。鉴于目前国内环境和外部需求低迷对日本的出口,实现这些条件具有一定的挑战性。
司机2:经济增长政策的不确定性和挑战结束通货紧缩
第二个司机的下调是不断上升的不确定性,政府促进中期增长的能力通过结构性经济改革——Abenomics的第三个“箭头”成功,将是至关重要的实现财政整顿。尽管一些指标显示经济活动上升在过去的一年里,潜在经济增长仍然很低。
在第二季度GDP增长大幅萎缩的今年4月1日推出后的第一步消费税增加,从8%下调至5%。输出也受恶劣天气影响在某种程度上在夏天。实际和名义GDP收缩又在今年第三季度,使日本经济陷入衰退以来的第三次全球金融危机。
而且GDP平减指数的复发,价格变动的广义,变为负值今年第三季度的突出困难的本质结束十多年的通货紧缩。虽然加大了日本央行的量化宽松政策可能再次移动平减指数10月回到积极的在2014年第四季度,经济振兴和价格通货再膨胀的任务是寻找更具挑战性比设想的安倍首相时,他介绍了他在2013年3月three-arrow经济政策方案。
进一步展望未来,最显著的结构性改革措施实施日期是减少企业税收在2015财年开始。细节尚未公布,因此对企业投资的影响仍不清楚。尚不清楚政府将进一步采取何种措施选择,或可以采取应对日本经济的根深蒂固的结构性问题,包括扩大劳动力参与,加强公司治理和处理人口趋势带来的挑战。
司机3:侵蚀的政策有效性和可信度可能削弱债务负担能力
降级的第三车手的潜在影响是前两个司机的负担能力和可持续性的日本巨大的债务负担。债务的可持续性,将依赖于持续的国内投资者愿意为政府提供资金以负担得起的利率。很可能仍然是这种情况,只要不是削弱了投资者信心。日本国债市场一直以稳定的低利率,尽管自1990年代以来异常上升的债务。和日本国债利率保持低且稳定通过一系列危机事件,包括日本1997 - 1998年的金融危机,2008年全球金融危机和2011年的海啸和福岛核电站的灾难。
尽管如此,日本央行的努力提高通货膨胀到2%可能最终施压政府债券收益率,从而提高政府借贷成本。利率上升将增加支出和浮力抵消所得收入。不断上升的不确定性有关政府实现其政策目标的能力可以提高产量没有相称的收入上升。结果将进一步削弱政府的能力,以满足其财政赤字目标和中期减少其债务负担,并最终开始削弱债务可持续性。
理由A1评级,且展望为稳定
日本的信贷支持的优势深国内债券市场,强大的机构,低易受外部冲击
无论政府所面临的挑战,日本仍非常重要的信用优势。A1评级,且展望为稳定支持的大型多元化的经济,我们描述为“高”的经济实力。甚至非常重要的债务负担,我们相信日本展览只对事件风险的敏感性较低。标志着本土偏好的居民投资者提供了强大的资金基础的国内投资者保留明显倾向于政府债券,它允许财政赤字是资助全球最低的名义利率在过去的二十年里。私营部门的财政盈余仍然足够多为政府赤字提供资金,没有政府求助于外部资金。我们相信,非常高的制度和结构优势,包括决定性的和强大的中央银行,目前维持这种资金优势和不太可能减少评级地平线。
尽管日本政府融资需求总值远远大于其他发达国家政府的或有风险,可能会进一步提高此类融资需求低和远程。日本的银行和企业部门近年来恢复他们的健康的资本化和去杠杆化。家庭债务是中等水平,在过去十年保持稳定。尽管低经济增长,日本的劳动力市场相对声音对关键特性,如低失业率水平,最近上升,就业和名义工资和劳动力参与率与其他发达经济体广泛可比性。
与日本本土偏好是其强劲的外部收支状况,它反映了系统范围的储蓄积累。在2013年超过GDP的60%,日本的净国际投资头寸远远大于任何20国集团发达的工业经济,绝缘全球经济和资本市场的冲击。收入从日本庞大的外部资产有助于维持经常账户盈余,虽然这已经减少由于转向贸易逆差,在很大程度上是由对能源进口的需求后,关闭在核电行业在2011年的海啸和福岛核电站的灾难。
评级下降/上升可能会什么
而稳定的表明我们相信评级前景也将在未来12到18个月,因素可能引发负面的评级行动包括重大分歧的路径实现财政目标;通缩压力的加剧,严重损失的经济势头;或外部经常账户盈余转变成持续的赤字。
穆迪将考虑积极的评级行动如果日本落实政策,我们得出的结论是可能恢复经济增长势头,提高重要的财政整顿和削减债务的前景。
人均国内生产总值(购买力平价基础上,美元):36654(实际2013)(也称为人均收入)
实际GDP增长(%)变化:1.5%(实际2013)(也称为GDP增长)
通货膨胀率(%改变12月/ 12月CPI):1.6% 2013(实际)
将军州长财政平衡/ GDP比例:-8.2%(实际2013)(也称为财政平衡)
当前帐户余额/ GDP比例:0.7%(实际2013)(也称为外部平衡)
外部债务/ GDP(不可用):
经济发展水平:非常高水平的经济弹性
默认的历史:没有违约事件(债券或贷款)自1983年以来的记录。
在2014年11月26日,评级委员会被讨论日本的评级,政府。在讨论提出的要点:发行人的机构强度/框架,已经大幅下降。发行人的财政或财务实力,包括它的债务状况,大幅减少了。分析发行人,相对于同行,表明其评级的重新定位是适当的。
本评级中使用的主要方法是主权债券评级在2013年9月出版。请在www.moodys.com上看到信贷政策页面这种方法的副本。
所有评价因素的权重是描述在本评级行动中使用的方法,如果适用的话。
新闻稿的其他评级受到这一行动将分别遵循。
监管信息披露
评级发行程序、系列或类别/类的债务,这一声明提供了某些监管披露与随后的每个评级相同系列的发行债券或票据或类别/类的债务或依照程序的评级是完全来自现有评级按照穆迪评级实践。评级发表支持提供者,这个声明提供了某些监管披露有关评级行动支持提供者和与每个特定评级行动证券,他们的信用评级来自供应商的信用评级的支持。对于临时评级,这个声明提供某些监管披露有关临时评级分配和与最终评级可能被分配后的最终发行债务,在每种情况下,交易结构和条款没有改变之前的任务明确评级的方式会影响评级。为进一步的信息,请参见在发行人评级标签/实体页面各自的发行人在www.moodys.com上。
对于任何影响证券或额定实体收到的直接信贷支持的主要实体(ies)这个评级行动,和其评级可能会改变结果的评级行动,相关的监管披露将担保人的实体。例外,这种方法存在以下披露,如果适用于管辖权:辅助服务,信息披露评级实体、信息披露评级实体。
监管披露本新闻稿中包含适用于信用评级,如果适用,相关评级前景或评级审查。
请参阅www.moodys.com上的任何更新的变化导致评级分析师和穆迪评级发行的法律实体。
请发行人/实体的评级标签页在www.moodys.com上额外的为每一个信用评级监管披露。
托马斯J伯恩
高级副总裁
主权风险组
穆迪投资者服务公司新加坡Pte . Ltd .)