醒醒吧，欧洲 by 索罗斯

Direction

Europe is facing a challenge from Russia to its very existence. Neither the European leaders nor their citizens are fully aware of this challenge or know how best to deal with it. I attribute this mainly to the fact that the European Union in general and the eurozone in particular lost their way after the financial crisis of 2008.
The fiscal rules that currently prevail in Europe have aroused a lot of popular resentment. Anti-Europe parties captured nearly 30 percent of the seats in the latest elections for the European Parliament but they had no realistic alternative to the EU to point to until recently. Now Russia is presenting an alternative that poses a fundamental challenge to the values and principles on which the European Union was originally founded. It is based on the use of force that manifests itself in repression at home and aggression abroad, as opposed to the rule of law. What is shocking is that Vladimir Putin’s Russia has proved to be in some ways superior to the European Union—more flexible and constantly springing surprises. That has given it a tactical advantage, at least in the near term.
Europe and the United States—each for its own reasons—are determined to avoid any direct military confrontation with Russia. Russia is taking advantage of their reluctance. Violating its treaty obligations, Russia has annexed Crimea and established separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine. In August, when the recently installed government in Kiev threatened to win the low-level war in eastern Ukraine against separatist forces backed by Russia, President Putin invaded Ukraine with regular armed forces in violation of the Russian law that exempts conscripts from foreign service without their consent.
In seventy-two hours these forces destroyed several hundred of Ukraine’s armored vehicles, a substantial portion of its fighting force. According to General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, the Russians used multiple launch rocket systems armed with cluster munitions and thermobaric warheads (an even more inhumane weapon that ought to be outlawed) with devastating effect.* The local militia from the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk suffered the brunt of the losses because they were communicating by cell phones and could thus easily be located and targeted by the Russians. President Putin has, so far, abided by a cease-fire agreement he concluded with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on September 5, but Putin retains the choice to continue the cease-fire as long as he finds it advantageous or to resume a full-scale assault.
In September, President Poroshenko visited Washington where he received an enthusiastic welcome from a joint session of Congress. He asked for “both lethal and nonlethal” defensive weapons in his speech. However, President Obama refused his request for Javelin hand-held missiles that could be used against advancing tanks. Poroshenko was given radar, but what use is it without missiles? European countries are equally reluctant to provide military assistance to Ukraine, fearing Russian retaliation. The Washington visit gave President Poroshenko a fa?ade of support with little substance behind it.
Equally disturbing has been the determination of official international leaders to withhold new financial commitments to Ukraine until after the October 26 election there (which will take place just after this issue goes to press). This has led to an avoidable pressure on Ukrainian currency reserves and raised the specter of a full-blown financial crisis in the country.
There is now pressure from donors, whether in Europe or the US, to “bail in” the bondholders of Ukrainian sovereign debt, i.e., for bondholders to take losses on their investments as a precondition for further official assistance to Ukraine that would put more taxpayers’ money at risk. That would be an egregious error. The Ukrainian government strenuously opposes the proposal because it would put Ukraine into a technical default that would make it practically impossible for the private sector to refinance its debt. Bailing in private creditors would save very little money and it would make Ukraine entirely dependent on the official donors.
To complicate matters, Russia is simultaneously dangling carrots and wielding sticks. It is offering—but failing to sign—a deal for gas supplies that would take care of Ukraine’s needs for the winter. At the same time Russia is trying to prevent the delivery of gas that Ukraine secured from the European market through Slovakia. Similarly, Russia is negotiating for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the borders while continuing to attack the Donetsk airport and the port city of Mariupol.
  
It is easy to foresee what lies ahead. Putin will await the results of the elections on October 26 and then offer Poroshenko the gas and other benefits he has been dangling on condition that he appoint a prime minister acceptable to Putin. That would exclude anybody associated with the victory of the forces that brought down the Viktor Yanukovych government by resisting it for months on the Maidan—Independence Square. I consider it highly unlikely that Poroshenko would accept such an offer. If he did, he would be disowned by the defenders of the Maidan; the resistance forces would then be revived.
Putin may then revert to the smaller victory that would still be within his reach: he could open by force a land route from Russia to Crimea and Transnistria before winter. Alternatively, he could simply sit back and await the economic and financial collapse of Ukraine. I suspect that he may be holding out the prospect of a grand bargain in which Russia would help the United States against ISIS—for instance by not supplying to Syria the S300 missiles it has promised, thus in effect preserving US air domination—and Russia would be allowed to have its way in the “near abroad,” as many of the nations adjoining Russia are called. What is worse, President Obama may accept such a deal.
That would be a tragic mistake, with far-reaching geopolitical consequences. Without underestimating the threat from ISIS, I would argue that preserving the independence of Ukraine should take precedence; without it, even the alliance against ISIS would fall apart. The collapse of Ukraine would be a tremendous loss for NATO, the European Union, and the United States. A victorious Russia would become much more influential within the EU and pose a potent threat to the Baltic states with their large ethnic Russian populations. Instead of supporting Ukraine, NATO would have to defend itself on its own soil. This would expose both the EU and the US to the danger they have been so eager to avoid: a direct military confrontation with Russia. The European Union would become even more divided and ungovernable. Why should the US and other NATO nations allow this to happen?
The argument that has prevailed in both Europe and the United States is that Putin is no Hitler; by giving him everything he can reasonably ask for, he can be prevented from resorting to further use of force. In the meantime, the sanctions against Russia—which include, for example, restrictions on business transactions, finance, and trade—will have their effect and in the long run Russia will have to retreat in order to earn some relief from them.
These are false hopes derived from a false argument with no factual evidence to support it. Putin has repeatedly resorted to force and he is liable to do so again unless he faces strong resistance. Even if it is possible that the hypothesis could turn out to be valid, it is extremely irresponsible not to prepare a Plan B.
There are two counterarguments that are less obvious but even more important. First, Western authorities have ignored the importance of what I call the “new Ukraine” that was born in the successful resistance on the Maidan. Many officials with a history of dealing with Ukraine have difficulty adjusting to the revolutionary change that has taken place there. The recently signed Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine was originally negotiated with the Yanukovych government. This detailed road map now needs adjustment to a totally different situation. For instance, the road map calls for the gradual replacement and retraining of the judiciary over five years whereas the public is clamoring for immediate and radical renewal. As the new mayor of Kiev, Vitali Klitschko, put it, “If you put fresh cucumbers into a barrel of pickles, they will soon turn into pickles.”
Contrary to some widely circulated accounts, the resistance on the Maidan was led by the cream of civil society: young people, many of whom had studied abroad and refused to join either government or business on their return because they found both of them repugnant. (Nationalists and anti-Semitic extremists made up only a minority of the anti-Yanukovych protesters.) They are the leaders of the new Ukraine and they are adamantly opposed to a return of the “old Ukraine,” with its endemic corruption and ineffective government.
The new Ukraine has to contend with Russian aggression, bureaucratic resistance both at home and abroad, and confusion in the general population. Surprisingly, it has the support of many oligarchs, President Poroshenko foremost among them, and the population at large. There are of course profound differences in history, language, and outlook between the eastern and western parts of the country, but Ukraine is more united and more European-minded than ever before. That unity, however, is extremely fragile.
The new Ukraine has remained largely unrecognized because it took time before it could make its influence felt. It had practically no security forces at its disposal when it was born. The security forces of the old Ukraine were actively engaged in suppressing the Maidan rebellion and they were disoriented this summer when they had to take orders from a government formed by the supporters of the rebellion. No wonder that the new government was at first unable to put up an effective resistance to the establishment of the separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine. It is all the more remarkable that President Poroshenko was able, within a few months of his election, to mount an attack that threatened to reclaim those enclaves.
To appreciate the merits of the new Ukraine you need to have had some personal experience with it. I can speak from personal experience although I must also confess to a bias in its favor. I established a foundation in Ukraine in 1990 even before the country became independent. Its board and staff are composed entirely of Ukrainians and it has deep roots in civil society. I visited the country often, especially in the early years, but not between 2004 and early 2014, when I returned to witness the birth of the new Ukraine.
I was immediately impressed by the tremendous improvement in maturity and expertise during that time both in my foundation and in civil society at large. Currently, civic and political engagement is probably higher than anywhere else in Europe. People have proven their willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. These are the hidden strengths of the new Ukraine that have been overlooked by the West.
The other deficiency of the current European attitude toward Ukraine is that it fails to recognize that the Russian attack on Ukraine is indirectly an attack on the European Union and its principles of governance. It ought to be evident that it is inappropriate for a country, or association of countries, at war to pursue a policy of fiscal austerity as the European Union continues to do. All available resources ought to be put to work in the war effort even if that involves running up budget deficits. The fragility of the new Ukraine makes the ambivalence of the West all the more perilous. Not only the survival of the new Ukraine but the future of NATO and the European Union itself is at risk. In the absence of unified resistance it is unrealistic to expect that Putin will stop pushing beyond Ukraine when the division of Europe and its domination by Russia is in sight.
Having identified some of the shortcomings of the current approach, I will try to spell out the course that Europe ought to follow. Sanctions against Russia are necessary but they are a necessary evil. They have a depressive effect not only on Russia but also on the European economies, including Germany. This aggravates the recessionary and deflationary forces that are already at work. By contrast, assisting Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression would have a stimulative effect not only on Ukraine but also on Europe. That is the principle that ought to guide European assistance to Ukraine.
Germany, as the main advocate of fiscal austerity, needs to understand the internal contradiction involved. Chancellor Angela Merkel has behaved as a true European with regard to the threat posed by Russia. She has been the foremost advocate of sanctions on Russia, and she has been more willing to defy German public opinion and business interests on this than on any other issue. Only after the Malaysian civilian airliner was shot down in July did German public opinion catch up with her. Yet on fiscal austerity she has recently reaffirmed her allegiance to the orthodoxy of the Bundesbank—probably in response to the electoral inroads made by the Alternative for Germany, the anti-euro party. She does not seem to realize how inconsistent that is. She ought to be even more committed to helping Ukraine than to imposing sanctions on Russia.
The new Ukraine has the political will both to defend Europe against Russian aggression and to engage in radical structural reforms. To preserve and reinforce that will, Ukraine needs to receive adequate assistance from its supporters. Without it, the results will be disappointing and hope will turn into despair. Disenchantment already started to set in after Ukraine suffered a military defeat and did not receive the weapons it needs to defend itself.
It is high time for the members of the European Union to wake up and behave as countries indirectly at war. They are better off helping Ukraine to defend itself than having to fight for themselves. One way or another, the internal contradiction between being at war and remaining committed to fiscal austerity has to be eliminated. Where there is a will, there is a way.
Let me be specific. In its last progress report, issued in early September, the IMFestimated that in a worst-case scenario Ukraine would need additional support of $19 billion. Conditions have deteriorated further since then. After the Ukrainian elections the IMF will need to reassess its baseline forecast in consultation with the Ukrainian government. It should provide an immediate cash injection of at least $20 billion, with a promise of more when needed. Ukraine’s partners should provide additional financing conditional on implementation of the IMF-supported program, at their own risk, in line with standard practice.
The spending of borrowed funds is controlled by the agreement between the IMF and the Ukrainian government. Four billion dollars would go to make up the shortfall in Ukrainian payments to date; $2 billion would be assigned to repairing the coal mines in eastern Ukraine that remain under the control of the central government; and $2 billion would be earmarked for the purchase of additional gas for the winter. The rest would replenish the currency reserves of the central bank.
The new assistance package would include a debt exchange that would transform Ukraine’s hard currency Eurobond debt (which totals almost $18 billion) into long-term, less risky bonds. This would lighten Ukraine’s debt burden and bring down its risk premium. By participating in the exchange, bondholders would agree to accept a lower interest rate and wait longer to get their money back. The exchange would be voluntary and market-based so that it could not be mischaracterized as a default. Bondholders would participate willingly because the new long-term bonds would be guaranteed—but only partially—by the US or Europe, much as the US helped Latin America emerge from its debt crisis in the 1980s with so-called Brady bonds (named for US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady).
Such an exchange would have a few important benefits. One is that, over the next two or three critical years, the government could use considerably less of its scarce hard currency reserves to pay off bondholders. The money could be used for other urgent needs.
By trimming Ukraine debt payments in the next few years, the exchange would also reduce the chance of a sovereign default, discouraging capital flight and arresting the incipient run on the banks. This would make it easier to persuade owners of Ukraine’s banks (many of them foreign) to inject urgently needed new capital into them. The banks desperately need bigger capital cushions if Ukraine is to avoid a full-blown banking crisis, but shareholders know that a debt crisis could cause a banking crisis that wipes out their equity.
Finally, Ukraine would keep bondholders engaged rather than watch them cash out at 100 cents on the dollar as existing debt comes due in the next few years. This would make it easier for Ukraine to reenter the international bond markets once the crisis has passed. Under the current conditions it would be more practical and cost-efficient for the US and Europe not to use their own credit directly to guarantee part of Ukraine’s debt, but to employ intermediaries such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the World Bank and its subsidiaries.
The Ukrainian state-owned company Naftogaz is a black hole in the budget and a major source of corruption. Naftogaz currently sells gas to households for $47 per thousand cubic meters (TCM), for which it pays $380 per TCM. At present people cannot control the temperature in their apartments. A radical restructuring of Naftogaz’s entire system could reduce household consumption at least by half and totally eliminate Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for gas. That would involve charging households the market price for gas. The first step would be to install meters in apartments and the second to distribute a cash subsidy to needy households.
The will to make these reforms is strong both in the new management and in the incoming government but the task is extremely complicated (how do you define who is needy?) and the expertise is inadequate. The World Bank and its subsidiaries could sponsor a project development team that would bring together international and domestic experts to convert the existing political will into bankable projects. The initial cost would exceed $10 billion but it could be financed by project bonds issued by the European Investment Bank and it would produce very high returns.
It is also high time for the European Union to take a critical look at itself. There must be something wrong with the EU if Putin’s Russia can be so successful even in the short term. The bureaucracy of the EU no longer has a monopoly of power and it has little to be proud of. It should learn to be more united, flexible, and efficient. And Europeans themselves need to take a close look at the new Ukraine. That could help them recapture the original spirit that led to the creation of the European Union. The European Union would save itself by saving Ukraine.
—October 23, 2014

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欧洲正面临一个挑战从俄罗斯到它的存在。欧洲领导人和公民充分意识到这一挑战或知道如何处理它。我这主要归因于这样一个事实:一般欧盟特别是欧元区2008年的金融危机后迷失了方向。
目前在欧洲盛行的财政规则引起了很多民怨。Anti-Europe方捕获近30%的席位在最新的欧洲议会选举,但他们没有现实的替代欧盟指直到最近。现在俄罗斯正在呈现另一种,构成了基本的价值观和原则挑战欧盟成立之初。它是基于使用武力,表现为镇压国内和国外侵略,而不是法治。令人震惊的是,弗拉基米尔•普京领导下的俄罗斯是在某些方面优于欧洲政治联盟更加灵活,不断创造惊喜。给了它一个战术优势,至少在短期内。
欧洲和美国每年为自身原因决定避免与俄罗斯的任何直接的军事对抗。俄罗斯是利用他们的不情愿。违反条约义务,俄罗斯已经吞并了克里米亚,建立了分离主义飞地在乌克兰东部。八月,当最近安装在基辅政府威胁要赢得在乌克兰东部的低级战争反对分裂势力在俄罗斯的支持下,普京总统入侵与普通军队违反俄罗斯乌克兰法律,免除了义务兵从外国服务没有他们的同意。
在七十二小时这些力量摧毁了数百名乌克兰的装甲车,很大一部分的战斗部队。根据韦斯利·克拉克将军,前北约欧洲盟军最高指挥官,俄国人使用多个发射火箭系统手持集束弹药和热压弹头(一个更不人道的武器,应该取缔)与毁灭性的效果。*乌克兰城市的当地民兵Dnepropetrovsk遭受的损失,因为他们通过手机交流,这样就可以很容易地找到并针对俄罗斯。普京总统,到目前为止,遵守停火协议,他得出结论与乌克兰总统秘书波罗申科9月5日,但普京仍选择继续停火,只要他发现它有利或恢复全面攻击。
在9月,波罗申科总统访问华盛顿时,他收到了热烈欢迎来自国会联席会议。他要求“致命的和非杀伤性”防御性武器。然而,奥巴马总统拒绝了他的请求标枪手持导弹可打击前进的坦克。波罗申科给出了雷达,但没有导弹有什么用?欧洲国家也同样不愿向乌克兰提供军事援助,担心俄罗斯的报复。总统访问华盛顿给波罗申科外观几乎没有物质的支持。
同样令人不安的是官方国际领导人的决心停止新的金融承诺,乌克兰,直到10月26日的选举后(后将这个问题去出版社)。这导致了一个乌克兰货币储备和可以避免的压力全面爆发的金融危机引起的恐慌。
现在有来自捐赠者的压力,无论是在欧洲或美国,债券持有人的“保释”乌克兰主权债务,即。对其投资债券持有人承担损失,进一步对乌克兰的官方援助的先决条件,把纳税人的钱更多地置于风险之下。这将是一个严重的错误。乌克兰政府极力反对这一提议,因为它将把乌克兰到技术性违约,是不可能使私人部门为其债务进行再融资。援助在私人债权人将节省一点点钱,这将使乌克兰完全依靠官方的捐助者。
更糟糕的是,俄罗斯是同时悬空胡萝卜和挥舞大棒。这是offering-but未能签署协议对乌克兰的天然气供应,照顾的需要过冬。同时俄罗斯正试图阻止交付乌克兰的天然气安全通过斯洛伐克欧洲市场。同样,俄罗斯是谈判的欧洲安全与合作组织监控边界同时继续袭击马里乌波尔顿涅茨克机场和港口城市。
很容易预见前方有什么。普京将于10月26日等待选举的结果,然后提供波罗申科气体和其他福利他一直晃来晃去,条件是他任命总理接受普京。这将排除任何人与力量的胜利,推翻了亚努科维奇政府的抵制它几个月Maidan-Independence广场。我认为这不大可能,波罗申科将接受这样的提议。如果他这么做了,他会否认的捍卫者练兵场,抵抗部队将被重新启用。
普京可能会恢复到较小的胜利,仍然会在他到达:他可以用武力打开一个陆路从俄罗斯到克里米亚及德涅斯特河沿岸共和国在冬天。或者,他可以简单地坐下来,等待乌克兰的经济和金融崩溃。我怀疑他可能坚持讨价还价的前景,俄罗斯将帮助美国对抗ISIS-for实例没有向叙利亚提供S300导弹已经承诺,因此实际上保留美国空军统治和俄罗斯将允许其在“近邻”,许多国家毗邻的俄罗斯被称为。更糟糕的是,奥巴马总统可能会接受这样的交易。
这将是一个悲剧性的错误,影响深远的地缘政治后果。没有低估伊希斯的威胁,我认为,保持独立的乌克兰应该优先;没有它,甚至对伊希斯联盟分崩离析。乌克兰的崩溃将是一个巨大的亏损北约,欧盟和美国。胜利的俄罗斯将成为更有影响力的在欧盟和构成有力威胁俄罗斯波罗的海国家的大型民族人口。而不是支持乌克兰,北约必须保卫自己的土壤。这将使欧盟和美国的危险他们都急于避免:直接与俄罗斯的军事对抗。欧盟将变得更加分裂和放肆的。为什么美国和其他北约国家允许这种事发生?
的论点,在欧洲和美国,普京没有希特勒,给予他一切可以合理要求,他可以阻止采取进一步使用武力。同时,制裁俄罗斯——包括,例如,对商业交易的限制,金融和贸易的影响,从长远来看,俄罗斯将不得不撤退是为了赚一些救济。
这些都是虚假的希望源于一个错误的论点没有事实证据来支持它。普京一再诉诸武力,他很容易再次这样做,除非他将面临强劲阻力。即使有可能假设可能是有效的,这是极其不负责任的不是准备一个B计划。
有两种不太明显,但更重要的反驳。首先,西方政府忽略了我称之为“新乌克兰”的重要性,出生在操场上的成功的阻力。历史的许多官员处理乌克兰很难适应那里发生了革命性的变化。最近签署联合协议的欧盟和乌克兰之间最初是与亚努科维奇政府协商。现在详细的路线图需要适应一个完全不同的情况。例如,路线图要求在5年内逐步更换和重新培训司法而公众强烈要求立即和激进的更新。作为基辅的新市长,维塔利克里奇科,所说,“如果你把新鲜的黄瓜泡菜的桶,他们很快就会变成泡菜。”
与一些广为流传的账户,操场上的阻力是由公民社会的精华:年轻人,其中许多人在国外学习,拒绝加入政府或企业在他们的回报,因为他们发现他们两人令人反感。(民族主义和反犹太极端分子的只有少数anti-Yanukovych抗议者。)新的乌克兰的领导人,他们坚决反对“老乌克兰”的回归政府的腐败和低效的。
新的乌克兰与俄罗斯侵略争辩,官僚阻力国内外,在一般人群和混乱。令人惊讶的是,它有许多寡头的支持,其中最重要的是波罗申科,总统和人群。当然有深远的历史上的差异,语言,和前景之间的东部和西部地区,但乌克兰比以往任何时候都更加团结,更亲。然而,团结是极其脆弱的。
新的乌克兰仍然是无法识别的,因为它把时间会使其影响力。它几乎没有安全部队在处置时诞生了。老乌克兰的安全部队积极参与镇压练兵场叛乱,今年夏天他们迷失方向时,他们不得不把订单从一个政府所形成的支持者叛乱。难怪新政府起初无法提出成立一个有效的抗分裂乌克兰东部的飞地。更加引人注目的是,美国总统波罗申科可以,几个月后他的选举,发起攻击,威胁要收回这些飞地。
欣赏的优点新的乌克兰你需要有一些个人经验。我能说从个人经验,尽管我必须承认偏见对其有利。我建立了一个基金会在乌克兰在1990年之前国家独立。董事会和员工是由完全的乌克兰人,在公民社会中深深扎根。我经常访问这个国家,尤其是在早期,但不是在2004年和2014年初,当我回到见证新的乌克兰的诞生。

我立即被印象深刻的巨大改进成熟和专业知识在此期间在我的基金会和公民社会。目前,公民和政治参与可能是高于欧洲其他地方。人们已经证明他们愿意为国家牺牲自己的生命。这些新乌克兰的隐藏的优势已经被西方忽略。
当前欧洲的其他缺陷对乌克兰的态度是它未能认识到俄罗斯攻击乌克兰是间接攻击欧盟及其治理原则。它应该很明显不适合一个国家,或国家协会,在战争采取财政紧缩的政策,欧盟继续做。所有可用资源应该把工作放在战争即使涉及运行预算赤字。新的乌克兰的脆弱性使得西方的矛盾更加危险。不仅新的乌克兰的生存,北约和欧盟的未来本身就是风险。在缺乏统一的电阻是不现实的期望,普京将停止推动乌克兰以外的部门欧洲和俄罗斯的统治。
确定了一些当前方法的缺点,我将试着阐明课程,欧洲应该遵循。制裁俄罗斯是必要的,但他们是一个祸端。他们有抑郁的影响不仅在俄罗斯,而且在欧洲国家,包括德国。这加剧经济衰退和通货紧缩的力量,已经在工作了。相比之下,帮助乌克兰对抗俄罗斯侵略会刺激作用不仅在乌克兰还在欧洲。这是原则,应该引导欧洲援助乌克兰。
作为财政紧缩的主要倡导者,德国需要了解涉及的内部矛盾。德国总理安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)表现作为一个真正的欧洲对俄罗斯的威胁。她一直对俄罗斯最重要的支持制裁,和她一直更愿意挑战德国公众舆论和商业利益上比在其它任何问题。只有在马来西亚民用客机被击落7月德国公众舆论赶上她。然而在财政紧缩她最近重申效忠的正统Bundesbank-probably为了应对选举进展由选择德国,反欧元的聚会。她似乎并没有意识到那是不一致的。她应该更致力于帮助乌克兰对俄罗斯实施制裁。
新的乌克兰的政治意愿来保护欧洲免受俄罗斯侵略和从事激进的结构性改革。保持和加强,乌克兰需要接收足够的援助的支持者。没有它,结果将是令人失望的,希望会变成绝望。觉醒已经开始在乌克兰遭受战败后,没有得到所需的武器自卫。
是时候为欧盟成员醒来,像国家间接战争。他们帮助乌克兰更好保护自己不必为自己而战。这样或那样的方式,内部矛盾处于战争状态,剩余致力于财政紧缩必须消除。有志者事竟成,有一种方法。
我要具体。在其去年进展报告,发表在9月初,IMFestimated在最糟糕的情况下乌克兰需要190亿美元的额外支持。条件进一步恶化。乌克兰大选后国际货币基金组织将需要重新评估其基线预测与乌克兰政府协商。它应该提供一个至少200亿美元的资金注入,在需要的时候承诺的更多。乌克兰的合作伙伴应该提供额外的融资条件实现的国际货币基金组织资助的项目中将更加突出,自担风险,符合标准的做法。
借入资金的支出是由国际货币基金组织和乌克兰政府之间的协议。四十亿美元将用于支付缺口乌克兰到目前为止,20亿美元将分配给修复在乌克兰东部煤矿,保持中央政府的控制下;20亿美元将用于购买额外的气体过冬。其余部分将补充央行的外汇储备。
新的援助计划将包括一个债务交换,改变了乌克兰的硬通货债券债务(总额近180亿美元)为长期的、低风险的债券。这将减轻乌克兰的债务负担和降低其风险溢价。参与交易,债券持有人将同意接受一个较低的利率和等待更长时间才能把钱拿回来。交易所将自愿和以市场为基础的,这样它就不能看到自违约。债券持有人将参与自愿,因为新的长期债券将已只有部分的美国或欧洲,就像美国帮助拉丁美洲走出债务危机在1980年代所谓布雷迪债券(以美国财政部长尼古拉斯·布雷迪命名)。
这样的交易将有一些重要的好处。一个是,在接下来的两到三个关键年,政府可以使用大大减少其稀缺的硬通货储备来偿还债券持有人。钱可以用于其他紧急需求。
乌克兰通过削减债务在未来几年内,交流也会降低主权债务违约的可能性,抑制资本外逃和逮捕的初期运行在银行。这将使它更容易说服乌克兰的银行的所有者(其中许多外国)注入急需的新资本。银行迫切需要更大的缓冲资本如果乌克兰是避免银行危机全面爆发,但股东知道债务危机可能导致银行业危机,擦拭自己的股权。
最后,乌克兰将使债券持有人参与而不是看他们的现金在100美分美元作为现有债务到期在未来几年。这将使乌克兰更容易进入国际债券市场一旦危机已经过去。在当前条件下,那将是更实用和有成本效益的美国和欧洲不直接使用自己的信用保证乌克兰的部分债务,但雇佣中介机构,如欧洲复兴开发银行和世界银行及其分支机构。
乌克兰国有公司Naftogaz黑洞在预算和腐败的主要来源。乌克兰天然气公司目前销售天然气家庭47美元每千立方米(中医),每立方米为它支付380美元的价格。目前人在他们的公寓不能控制温度。激进的重组Naftogaz的整个系统可以减少家庭消费至少一半,完全消除乌克兰对俄罗斯天然气的依赖。这将涉及家庭天然气市场价格收费。第一步是安装米公寓和第二分发现金补贴贫困家庭。
将使这些改革强在新的管理和新政府,但任务是极其复杂(你如何定义贫困是谁?)和专业知识是不够的。世界银行及其子公司可以赞助一个项目开发团队,汇集国际和国内专家将现有的政治意愿转化为卖座的项目。最初的成本将超过100亿美元,但这可能是项目资金由欧洲投资银行发行的债券,它将产生非常高的回报。
也是时候欧盟关键看自己。欧盟必须有毛病,如果普京的俄罗斯即使在短期内可以如此成功。欧盟官僚机构不再垄断权力,它几乎没有值得骄傲的。它应该学会更加统一、灵活和高效。和欧洲人自己需要仔细看看新的乌克兰。可以帮助他们夺回的原始精神导致了欧盟的诞生。欧盟将拯救自己储蓄乌克兰。
2014年10月23日